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The central prediction of the Aghion et al. (2005) model is an inverted U-shaped 
relation between innovation and competition. The model is built on the assumption of a 
product market and has not yet been empirically tested on service-sector firms. Using 
detailed firm-level data, we find the inverse U-shaped relation to hold for both small 
and large service-sector firms. However, non-exporting service firms deviate from the 
overall pattern. A more detailed breakdown of innovation expenditures shows that the 
inverse U-shaped pattern holds for both intramural R&D and training, but not for 
extramural R&D. Finally, as competition increases, small firms tend to seek more 
strategic alliances with competitors while large firms tend to decrease their 
collaboration with competitors. To some extent, the behavior of large firms can be due 
to their greater capacity to handle innovation projects internally and as competition 
increases, so does the payoff of an edge to competitors.  
 
 
Keywords: R&D, innovation, competition, service sector 
JEL classification codes: D40, L10, L60, O30
 
                                                           
Acknowledgements: Financial support from The Nordic Innovation Center (NIC), Swedish Council for 
Working Life and Social Research (FAS) and Jan Wallander’s and Tom Hedelius’ Research Foundations 
is gratefully acknowledged. E-mail: Patrik.gustavsson@hhs.se; Patrik.karpaty@oru.se, Corresponding 
author, Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall. 1.  Introduction 
 
When thinking about competition and R&D, the manufacturing sector is often 
considered and the service sector ignored. However, in many rich developed countries, 
the size of the service sector has outgrown the manufacturing sector by a factor of about 
two. Despite the economic impact of the service sector, relatively little is known about 
service-sector innovation and how innovation in service-sector firms responds to 
competition. According to Schumpeter (1934), the monopoly deadweight loss is the 
price we have to pay to finance and stimulate firm R&D. That is, increased competition 
leads to less R&D and a lower rate of innovation and economic growth. The 
Schumpeterian argument is that competition reduces the expected pay-off from R&D 
and therefore reduce firm R&D. This prediction has triggered a number of theoretical 
papers which, in contrast to Schumpeter’s view, have shown that increased competition 
stimulates innovation and R&D. For example, Porter (1990) states that competition is 
good for growth because it forces firms to innovate in order to stay in business.  
In an important paper, Aghion et al. (2005) combine theories on competition and 
R&D showing that the positive impact of competition on R&D probably dominates 
when the level of competition is low while at a higher level of competition, additional 
increases in competition decrease firm R&D. That is, an inverse U-shaped form is 
predicted.  
To the best of our knowledge, no paper has explicitly investigated the inverse U-
shape proposition for the service sector. Examples of studies that have found a non-
linear – inverse U-shaped form – between competition and R&D include e.g. Scott 
(1984), Levin et al. (1985) and, more recently, Aghion et al. (2005), Poldahl and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 Tingvall (2006), Azkenazy et al. (2008) and Kilponen and Santavirta (2007) using UK, 
Swedish, French and Finnish firm-level data, respectively. 
 However, several gaps remain to be filled. First, existing studies have focused on 
the manufacturing sector leaving a question mark on the generality of the results. 
Second, improvements in the measurement of competition have come into play. In 
particular, the Boone (2008) and Boone et. al. (2007) Price Elasticity (PE) measure 
(focusing on the elasticity of output w.r.t. changes in input prices) has been shown to 
capture competition well. Third, as pointed out by e.g. Grünfeldt et al. (2006), it may be 
particularly problematic to use R&D as the only measure of efforts spent in innovative 
activities in the service sector. For example, the concept of ice-hotels is to be regarded 
as a service-sector innovation but the resources spent on developing the concept are 
most likely not found in firms’ R&D figures. Hence, alternative response patterns 
should be taken into account. 
Using detailed Swedish firm-level data, we apply the Boone PE-measure and the 
Herfindahl index to explore how innovation in the service sector responds to 
competition. In addition, we combine CIS survey-data on firms’ innovative activity with 
detailed firm-level register data. This combination allows us to explore other response 
patterns than increasing/decreasing total R&D expenditures while simultaneously 
keeping track of firm performance and competition. Alternative responses include e.g. 
how innovative activities such as intramural R&D, extramural R&D, and firms’ 
spending on acquiring external knowledge (education and training programs etc.) are 
affected by competition.  
Competition may not only affect the amount of resources spent on innovative 
activities, it may also alter firms’ incentives to collaborate with competitors in 
 innovative activities. That is, competition may alter the incentive to form strategic 
alliances. The linked CIS innovation survey and firm-level register data allow us to 
empirically analyze these questions. 
Our results point at an inverse U-shaped relation between competition and R&D. 
More precisely, with the exception of non-exporting firms, the Boone PE-measure and 
the Herfindahl index usually come up with an inverse U-shaped shape.  
Using CIS innovation data to decompose innovation expenditures, we find intramural 
R&D and training to show an inverse U-shaped relation to competition while 
extramural R&D decreases with competition. Additional results show that as 
competition increases, there is not only a decrease in extramural R&D but also in the 
propensity for large firms to form strategic alliances with competitors. This behavior 
may be explained by the fact that the value of a marginal edge to the competitors goes 
up as competition becomes sharper.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the related 
literature. Data, variables, theoretical predictions and estimation issues are discussed in 
section 3, section 4 contains the econometric results and section 5 concludes. 
 
 2. Related literature
Over the years, studies on competition and innovation/R&D have shifted their focus 
from mainly industry-level studies toward firm-level studies. Despite the change in unit 
of observation, no consensus on the shape of the relation between competition and 
innovation/R&D has been reached. For example, Horowitz (1962), Mansfield (1968), 
 1 and Crépon et al. (1998)  found competition to decrease R&D. Examples of studies that 
find a positive correlation between competition and R&D include Mukhopadhyay 
(1985), Geroski (1990), Blundell et al. (1995) and Nickell (1996).  
Given that one want to wipe out fixed effects, one may apply a dynamic set-up using 
GMM based estimators and estimate fixed-effect models, or perform the analysis in first 
differences. In this tradition, Nickell (1996), Aghion et al. (2005) and Mulkay et al. 
(2000) apply one or a combination of these estimators on US, UK and French firms. 
Despite their methodological similarity, the results do not point in the same direction. 
Nickell finds that increased concentration increases productivity growth in UK-based 
companies,  Aghion et al. (2005) find robust evidence of an inverted U-shaped relation 
between product market competition and innovation in a sample of 330 UK firms, while 
Mulkay et al. find that profits boost R&D in US firms but no significant impact on 
French firms.  
Another factor that may be crucial for the results is how competition is measured. A 
frequently used way of measuring competition is to quantify the degree of market 
concentration. Examples are the share of sales concentrated to the three or five largest 
firms in an industry (C3 and C5) and the Herfindahl index that also takes into account 
the distribution of market shares. Studies using market concentration as a measure of 
competition do not all come up with similar conclusion. For example, in a study of 
innovation in West German firms, Kraft (1989) finds that increased market 
concentration boosts firm R&D while Mansfield (1983) concludes that an increased rate 
of technological change is often associated with increased competition. Analyzing 4 378 
                                                           
1 The main goal of the Crépon et al. study is not to study competition and R&D but rather to link R&D, 
innovation and productivity. 
 innovations in the UK, Geroski (1990), finds no support for the hypothesis that 
competition is bad for innovation and growth.  
Finally, the early literature focused mostly on a linear (or log-linear) relation between 
competition and R&D; some exceptions are Scott (1984) and Levin et al. (1985) who 
without explicitly seeking for an inverse U-shaped relation found some evidence of an 
inverse U-shaped relation between competition and R&D. Since Aghion et al. (2005), 
an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and R&D has been detected by 
e.g. Azkenazy et al. (2008), Poldahl and Tingvall (2006) and Kilponen and Santavirta 
(2008). The Azkenazy et al. (2008) study includes data for all French businesses with at 
least 500 employees and covers both the service and the manufacturing sector. 
Azkenazy et al. (2008) do not separate the analysis among sectors and this precludes us 
from drawing any specific conclusions about the behavior of service-sector firms. 
 
3. Theoretical background and variables 
3.1 Theoretical background 
The main prediction of the Aghion et al. (2005) model is an inverted U-shaped relation 
between competition and R&D. The intuition behind the positively sloping segment – 
the escape competition effect − is that the more neck-to-neck competition there is (small 
productivity differences across firms), the greater is the pay-off from an edge over the 
competitors. Hence, if competition is fierce, firms might escape competition by 
innovating. On the other hand, as predicted by the Schumpeterian model, profits will be 
limited at high levels of competition, thus making it hard to recover R&D expenditures. 
Hence, competition holds back R&D. Put together, these two contradicting forces give 
rise to an inverse U-shaped relationship between competition and R&D. 
  In addition to Aghion et al. (2005), Haruyama (2006) offers three additional reasons 
for an inverted U-shaped relation between competition and innovation.
2  
Finally, as pointed out by e.g. Hipp and Grupp (2005) and Tether (2007), the 
innovation process does not only concern R&D and this might be particularly true for 
the service sector where technology is rather embodied in knowledge than in machinery 
and equipment. Accordingly, one should go beyond intramural R&D when analyzing 
how competition affects service-sector firms’ expenditures on innovative activities. 
As noted in the IO literature, cooperation with a competitor in an R or D project 
(forming a strategic alliance) may be a way for the firm of escaping competition 
(Reinganum, 1989).
3 Therefore, we conclude with an analysis of how the propensity to 
participate in a strategic alliance is affected by competition.  
Services differ from manufactured goods in some respects. First, services are 
typically produced and consumed in the same geographical location, i.e. there is a 
spatial or regional dimension involved. This means that the effects of competition on 
service firms’ innovative activities will also be hampered by this spatial dimension. 
Second, in comparison to the manufacturing sector, knowledge generated in the service 
sector is often less connected to physical innovations. Hence, education, training and 
similar pro innovative activities should be more important in the service sector than in 
the manufacturing sector − thus motivating that efforts should be spent to shed light on 
these activities and not only on R&D expenditures per se. 
 
                                                           
2 Harauyma points at (i) the cumulative aspects of R&D, (ii) that firm’s do not only conduct R&D and 
(iii) that components are often improved independently of each other but may interact with other 
components. 
3 There may be several motives behind forming a strategic alliance; suggestions highlighted in the 
literature include motives such as risk minimization, cost minimization, shortening of development 
 3.2 Variables 
Our base-case measure used to proxy innovation is register data on firms’ R&D 
expenditures covering all firms with at least 50 employees. CIS innovation surveys 2 
through 5 allow us to decompose firms’ innovation expenditures. To be precise, we 
decompose firms’ expenditures on innovative activities to: (i) intramural R&D, (ii) 
extramural R&D and (iii) expenditures on achieving external knowledge (education, 
training etc). Finally, we have a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is engaged in 
an innovation project with a competitor (strategic alliance).  
  We apply two measures of competition that aim at capturing different aspects 
of competition. First, we have the Herfindahl index (H) − more competitors and/or more 
equally distributed market shares produce a lower value of the Herfindahl index, 
indicating increased competition. It should be borne in mind that, by construction, the 
Herfindahl index does not capture competition between domestic firms and firms 
located abroad. Therefore, the Herfindahl index is more appropriate for economies with 
a large domestic market than for small economies.
4 Second, we have the Boone price 
elasticity measure (PE).  
The idea behind the PE-measure is that the elasticity of output is more sensitive 
to cost changes in more competitive industries. One advantage of the PE measure is that 
if firms change their way of conduct for some external reason and start to compete more 
intensively, resulting in firm exit, both the Herfindahl index and the price cost margin 
might signal decreased competition, while the PE-measure correctly picks up the 
change; for details, see Bone (2007). We estimate the PE-measure following Boone 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cycles, complementarities in resources and competition/market structure motives. For a survey, see e.g. 
Hagedoorn et. al. (2000), Dunning, (1997) and Teece (1992). 
4 For example, the US competition authorities use the Herfindahl index as a guideline for making 
decisions on approving mergers and acquisitions; see e.g. FTC (1995). 
 (2008) and Boone et al. (2007) to derive the elasticity of profits with respect to marginal 
costs. The measure is generated by an OLS estimation of the following relation for each 
year and each 4-digit industry:  
ijt t ijt jt j ijt d c ε β α π + + + = ) ln( ) ln(     (eq.  1) 
 
where i is a firm-level identifier, j is an industry indicator and t indicates the time 
period. Variable profits, π, are calculated as value added less the total wage bill and 
marginal costs are approximated by average variable costs, c, which are defined as the 
total wage bill plus the costs of variable inputs (sales less value added), divided by 
sales. The estimated profit elasticity, βjt, is used as our time-varying industry measure of 
product market competition.  
An issue that is often neglected in the literature on globalization and the 
measurement of competition is that the market is often located in the home country, 
while the R&D activity may be concentrated to one country. Hence, competition in 
foreign markets may affect the amount of R&D performed at home. Therefore, if firms 
are unable to segment markets, the Boone PE-measure might be preferable to the 
Herfindahl index.  
A firm does not rely on internally generated technology only, technology 
generated outside the firm is also important. The stock of firm-specific knowledge may 
come from different sources that are internal or external to the firm, such as intramural 
R&D, learning by doing and knowledge spillovers. Knowledge spillovers may be 
domestic or international following e.g. input-output links and trade. In this context, the 
importance of learning through export becomes clear. An argument put forward for 
export to promote R&D is that export enhances the absorption of outside knowledge. 
 Hence, export reduces the cost of overcoming the next generation of knowledge and 
therefore increases the possibility of successful R&D.
5 We incorporate trade-related 
spillovers by adding firms’ export ratio into the analysis.
6  
Knowledge and technology may not only stem from foreign identities. A firm 
that is distant from the technology frontier may have more outside information to absorb 
than the leading-edge firm. Following e.g. Griffith et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. 
(2005), we capture this type of spillover using a technology gap parameter measuring 
the distance to the technological leader in the industry.  
One characteristic of the Aghion et al. (2005) model is that it predicts the 
“escape competition effect” to be the strongest in leveled industries (where firms 
compete neck-to-neck).
7 Following Poldahl and Tingvall (2006), we test this hypothesis 
by including an interaction between the intra-industry technology gap and the degree of 
competition. 
The maybe most well-analyzed variable causing firm R&D is firm size. Decades of 
empirical research on the relationship between firm size and R&D have established a 
consensus view of an elasticity of R&D with respect to firm size close to unity. We 
control for firm size throughout all estimations.  
In the literature on embodied technological change (Stoneman, 1983), technological 
progress is propelled by investment in new machinery, thus pointing at a link between 
                                                           
5 For the role of trade as a carrier of knowledge spillovers, see e.g. Griliches, 1992; Stoneman 1995, 
Coe and Helpman 1995 and Keller 2000. 
6 Griliches (1992) points at substantive and significant spillovers associated with trade. In addition, in line 
with Griliches (1992), Wolfgang Keller (see e.g. Keller 1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b) finds evidence of 
trade-related technology spillovers. 
7 Leveled industries are industries characterized by small differences between firms in terms of 
productivity. Within these industries, competition among firms is high and a small step outside the 
current production frontier may result in large gains. This will trigger firms to steal market shares from 
their competitors and will hence stimulate their R&D activities. Firms will escape competition by 
innovating; see Aghion et al. (2005).  
 capital and R&D. Hence, to single out the impact of competition on firm innovation and 
R&D, we control for capital intensity (K/L).  
In the Aghion et al. (2005) model, labor is homogenous − all workers are equally 
well suited for R&D − and each firm chooses the allocation of labor to R&D that 
maximizes the current value of profits. However, it might be plausible to argue that 
R&D is dependent on the skill composition of the labor force. To control for firms’ skill 
composition, we include the share of skilled workers (workers with at least post-
secondary education). An econometric issue is the direction of causality; do firms’ R&D 
expenditures depend on their human capital abundance or vice versa? We tackle 
possible endogeneity using an instrumental variable approach and the full model 
specification takes the form
8: 
 
) σ iid(0, ~ ε ; ε ln(K/L) β ln(Size) β
(export) β ) (neckness β ) gap (A β
(Skillint) β on) (competiti β α α α D) & ln(R
2
ε ijt ijt ijt 7 ijt 6
ijt 5 4 3
ijt 2 jt 1 t ij 0 ijt
+ + +
+ + − +
+ + + + =
− − s ijt s ijt  (eq.2) 
 
where R&D is expenditures on R&D in firm i in industry j at time t, skillint is the share 
of skilled workers, A-gap is the distance to the industry technological leader, neckness is 
the degree of neck-to-neckness, export is firm export ratio, Size is firm size measured as 
the number of employees, K/L is capital intensity, competition is captured by the 
Herfindahl index and the Boone PE-measure and ε is the classical error term.  
                                                           
8 In Sweden, approximately 21% percent of the workers with post-secondary education within the 
manufacturing industry are involved in R&D-related work (Statistics Sweden, 2001). 
     3.3 Data and variable construction 
Data stems from Statistics Sweden (SCB) and covers the years 1997 through 2005. Four 
different databases have been merged: (i) the Financial Statistics (FS) Database, (ii) the 
R&D survey and (iii) the Regional Labor Market Statistics Database (Rams). These 
three register databases include all manufacturing and service-sector firms and with a 
slight abuse of notation, we label the merged outcome of (i) through (iii) Financial 
Statistics, or only “FS”. FS data does not only provide us with information on the profit 
and loss account of the firm, and its associated variables such as gross production and 
value added, employment, capital stock, purchases of other inputs, R&D expenditure 
etc., but also with information on workers’ level of education, gender and age.  
We have register information on R&D activities of firms from the FS Database 
and the bi-annual R&D survey.
9 Both these sources have their advantages and 
shortcomings. The advantage of the R&D data from the FS Database is that it has been 
collected on a yearly basis during the years 1986-2005 and covers all firms with at least 
50 employees.
10  The bi-annual R&D data from the R&D survey is collected for firms 
that reported R&D expenditures of no less than 2 million SEK in the FS questionnaire. 
In the R&D survey, firms should give the exact amount. 
In addition to these three register based data-sets we have additional 
information on firms’ innovation efforts from the “Innovation Activity in Swedish 
Enterprises Surveys” (CIS). The CIS data used here is drawn from the CIS 2-survey 
                                                           
9 Data on the R&D variable stems from the Financial Statistics (FS) and covers all firms with at least one 
employee active in R&D activities at a minimum of 50% of full time. The FS is retrieved annually and it 
is compulsory for firms to reply. The respondents are asked to give an exact figure for R&D expenditure 
or answer in an interval scale. R&D is not evenly distributed across industries. 
10 In the FS register, the firm may give an answer within specific intervals of SEK; 1-249 000, 250 000-
999 000, 1-4.9 million, 5-9.9 million and then 10 million or more. If the yearly R&D expenditures exceed 
10 million SEK, the firms shall specify the exact amount. 
 1994-1996, the CIS 3-survey 1998-2000, the CIS 4-survey 2002-2004 and the CIS 5-
survey 2004-2006.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, firm averages for service-sector firms, 1997-2005 
Exporters Non-exp.  CIS  CIS       
L > 50  L > 50  10<L<50  L > 50 
R&D 3975  1363    n.a.  28503
(R&D/sales)*100 1.61  0.33    n.a.    1.97
Intramural R&D           59 314
Extramural R&D           20 89
Training/firm           26 95
Size (L)  141  109    19 213
Share skilled labor  0.34  0.22    0.24 0.25
ln(K/L) 4.81  4.74    5.1 5.4
Export ratio  0.18  0    0.01 0.28
Technology gap  13  14.3    14.06 12.2
PE-measure -3.84  -3.78    -3.95 -4.54
Herfindahl index  704  641    876 1449
Strategic alliance y/n  n.a.  n.a.  0.03 0.07
Obs.  10 033  18 434    4 848 3 099
Note: Observations in columns 1-2 stem from the financial statistics (FS), including all service firms. The 
figures in columns 3-4 stem from firms observed in the CIS innovation survey. Due to the sampling of 
innovative firms into the innovation survey, the observed R&D-intensity is greater in the survey than in 
the whole population.  
 
 
From the four CIS Surveys, we have extracted information on firms’ expenditures on: 
intramural R&D, extramural R&D, external knowledge (education, training etc.) and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm co-operates with a competitor in an 
innovation project.  
The respondent rates for CIS surveys are quite high. The overall response rate in the 
CIS 2-survey was 75% and 70% in the manufacturing and service sector, respectively.. 
The response rate has remained high in the following surveys, especially for our main 
variables.  
We calculate capital stocks using an extended PI-method. TFP is measured using the 
Törnqvist index number approach and a detailed variable description is given in the 
Appendix.  
 Summary statistics of the variables are given in Table 1 and description by industry 
in Table A4. As seen in Table A4, the variation in R&D across industries is larger than 
the variation in e.g. firm size, export ratio and competition and from Table 1 we find 
that the export intensity of small firms (included in the CIS survey) is around 1 percent 
while the export intensity of larger firms is as high as 28 percent. In all, this points at a 
substantial heterogeneity across firms and industries and a need for analyzing data from 
different perspectives. 
 
4. RESULTS  
4.1. Basic models 
As noted above, R&D expenditures in FS and the Research Statistics are truncated from 
below; accordingly in Table 2, we present results from the Tobit regression estimated 
on all firms with at least 50 employees.  
Columns 1-2 show results using a basic set-up that we expand in columns 3-4 
to also include measures of export, catching up (technology gap) and neck-to-neckness 
competition. 
  The control variables match our prior expectations. The effect of human capital 
intensity (workers with at least tertiary education) and physical capital per worker is 
both positive and highly significant.
11 A coefficient for firm size above unity indicates 
that large firms, on average, are more R&D intensive than smaller ones (indicating 
increasing returns in R&D).   
In columns 3-4, we augment the model with export, catching up and a variable 
capturing neck-to-neckness competition. The technology gap variable allows us to 
 analyze catching up and domestic intra-industry spillovers. Our results suggest that the 
further away a firm is from the technological leader, the less it spends on R&D while 
export is positively related to R&D activity. No evidence of an impact of neck-to-
neckness on firm R&D is found.
12  
 
Table 2. Competition and R&D, Tobit estimation 
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Period  dum      yes      Yes      Yes      yes 
Industry dum      yes      Yes      Yes      yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.14 0.14  0.16 0.16 
Obs  25 021  24 744  24 408  24 131 
F-test Comp 
(A)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
t-value within parenthesis ().
(A) F-test competition variables. 
 
To visualize the relation between competition and R&D, we depict the estimated 
relation of the empirical range of the competition variables. To simplify the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11 As discussed above, due to endogeneity, we instrument the human capital variable and the instruments 
are lagged values of the skill variable, average wage, ownership and fixed effects.  
 interpretation, the competition variables are multiplied by minus one (-1), implying that 









Figure 1. Curvature of estimated relation between competition and R&D 
 
Note: All curves in Figure 1 are significant at the one-percent level. The competition variables are 
multiplied by minus one (-1) implying that higher values are interpreted as higher levels of competition. 
The complete set of regression results are found in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 1 shows the results drawn from estimations in Table 2. The Herfindahl index 
suggests a clear inverse U-shaped relation between competition and R&D. For the 
Boone PE-measure, within the interval for which the price elasticity is observed, the 
negative second-order term does not overcome the positive term and no downward 
sloping Schumpeterian segment is achieved. In addition, appending the neck-to-
neckness variable, the firm export ratio and the catching up variable does not alter the 
observed curvature to any considerable extent. 
 
4.2. Exporters and non-exporters 
One characteristic of services is that they are often produced and consumed 
simultaneously (at one geographic point). Hence, competition has a geographic bound. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12 In models with a Herfindahl index, we interact the A-gap with the Herfindahl index; similarly we 
 At the same time, more services are becoming tradable. Service firms producing 
tradable output will – like many manufacturing firms – compete with firms that may be 
located at a distance. Hence, there are reasons to expect firms producing tradables to be 
more exposed to competition than service firms in the non-tradable segment, and since 
their situation is similar to that of manufacturing firms, they also behave similarly to 
manufacturing firms. Therefore, we split the sample into non-exporting and exporting 
service firms, as well as the sub-groups service exporters and non-service exporters. 
Table 1 indicates that the difference in competition faced by exporters and non-
exporters is relatively small. However, even if the estimated level of competition does 
not differ to any considerable extent, the response pattern may. Results from the Tobit 









Figure 2 . Exporting and non-exporting service firms. 
 
Note: In  the left-hand panel (Herfindahl index), an F-test indicates that all curve types but non-exporters 
are significant at the one-percent significance level. In the right-hand panel (Boone PE-measure), all 
curves are significant at the one-percent level. Competition variables are multiplied by minus one (-1), 
implying that higher values are interpreted as higher levels of competition. The complete set of regression 
results is found in the Appendix. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interact the A-gap with Boone-PE in estimations where the Boone-PE measure is used. 
 Figure 2 verifies the basic findings from Figure 1, namely that with the exception of 
non-exporters, there tends to be an inverse U-shaped relation between competition and 
R&D. To be precise, for the Herfindahl index, the only curve that is not inverse U-
shaped (and the only non-significant curve) is found for non-exporting service firms. 
Looking at the Boone PE-measure, all curves are significant at the one-percent level and 
everyone but non-exporters shows an inverse U-shaped pattern. Hence, the results for 
Swedish service firms indicate an inverse U-shaped relation which is in line with the 
results found for Swedish manufacturing firms; for details on manufacturing firms see 
Poldahl and Tingvall (2006).   
 
4.3. Decomposition of innovative activities 
It is plausible to argue that competition does not only affect intramural R&D but also 
outsourced (extramural) R&D and other innovative activities. Using data from four CIS 
surveys, we construct three categories of innovative activity: expenditures on intramural 
(local) R&D, expenditures on extramural (outsourced) R&D and expenditures on 
achieving external knowledge (education, training etc.).  
  About two thirds of the firms included in the CIS surveys report no 
expenditures on innovative activities. This is most likely an exaggeration. Arguments 
for firms to underreport expenditures on innovative activities include (i) small firms 
with no separate R&D department are probably more likely to report zeros, (ii) 
expenditures on innovative activities are sensitive and firms might be reluctant to 
disclose such information and (iii) Laursen (2008) argues that the CIS survey figures on 
innovation by design have a (mild) censoring and therefore, advocates Tobit 
estimations. Therefore, our econometric analysis is principally the same as before, 
 measures of competition as well as the control variables are defined correspondingly 
using the FS data, while our new measures of innovations stem from the CIS-surveys.
13  
Due to data limitations and in order to economize on observations, we estimate Tobit 
regressions using the basic model specification. Since firms with less than 50 employees 
are included in the CIS surveys, we define the competition measures for small and large 
firms, respectively. The limited size of the CIS surveys, the number of possible years to 
use and the matching of data leave us with a much smaller dataset (2 200 vs. 47 000 
obs.).
14 To adjust for the duration of the CIS surveys and possible lags between 
competition and innovative behavior, we lag CIS data one year when matching it on FS-
data.  
    Results on how various innovative activities respond to competition are 
depicted in Figure 3 below.
15 We find support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-
shaped relation between competition and both intramural R&D and training (acquiring 
external knowledge). However, no inverse U-shaped pattern is detected for extramural 
R&D.  As competition goes up, if anything, there is a tendency for large firms to shift 
R&D from extramural to intramural R&D. The shift from extramural to intramural 
R&D is shown in Table A3 columns 3-4 where we regress the allocation of 
intramural/extramural R&D on competition. The clearest result is found for the Boone 
PE-measure and large firms. For small firms, we do not find any significant reallocation 
which is probably due to a low degree of extramural R&D activity in small firms (with 
49 employees at most).  
                                                           
13 As a robustness test, we re-estimated Col. 1 (with the most significant competition variables) in Table 
A2 using XTGLS. The results are close to the Tobit estimates. For details, see the notes in Table A2. 
14 The previous analysis was only based on variables and firms with more than 50 employees, whereas 
from now on, the analysis and the variable construction are based on variables for firms with more than 
10 employees. 
15 Results from the regression analysis are given in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
 Comparing results from the Boone PE-measure and the Herfindahl index, we find the 
Herfindahl index to generally yield significant results for different innovative activities  
while the Bone PE-measure is mostly insignificant (except for training). However, for 
intramural R&D, the curvature from the two measures is relatively similar.  
 
 



















Note: In the left-hand (Herfindahl index) panel, the F-test indicates all curves but training to be 
significant at the ten-percent significance level. In the right-hand panel (Boone PE-measure), the F-test 
indicates that only training for large firms is significant at the ten-percent significance level. Competition 
variables are multiplied by minus one (-1), implying that higher values are interpreted as higher levels of 
competition. The complete set of regression results is found in the Appendix. 
 
Finally, from a policy perspective, it is interesting to note that the downward sloping 
segment where increased competition contracts innovative expenditures only occurs at 
 relatively high levels of competition. Hence, the risk that fighting monopoly and lack of 
competition will decrease innovative activities is relatively small. 
 
4.4 Extension: Competition and strategic alliances  
To broaden the picture of firm response to competition, we finally analyze whether 
competition affects firms’ incentives to cooperate in innovative activities with 
competitors, here labeled strategic alliances. As noted above, there are several motives 
for firms to form a strategic alliance and competition may play a role in that decision. 
The results given in Table A3 are somewhat inconclusive. Combining results from the 
Herfindahl index and the Boone PE-measure points at, if anything, competition tending 
to increase the probability of small firms forming a strategic alliance with a competitor, 
while the opposite is true for larger firms. That is, increasing competition tends to 
decrease (increase) the incentive for large (small) firms to participate in a strategic 
alliance. 
  As pointed out by Aghion et al. (2005), as competition increases, it becomes 
increasingly important to remain at the technology frontier – a task which is facilitated 
by cooperation with a competitor. In addition, for small firms it may be difficult to host 
research and development project by themselves. This is a possible explanation as to 
why small firms tend to seek more strategic alliances as competition goes up. However, 
for larger firms with a greater capacity to host innovative activities, the playing field is 
somewhat different. On the one hand, a strategic alliance decreases the risk with an 
innovation project but, at the same time, decreases the expected pay off from R&D 
expenditures. Since large firms typically have a larger potential to host innovation 
 projects and the pay off increases with competition, it may be tactically correct for 
larger firms to behave differently than smaller firms.
16
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The central prediction of the Aghion et al. (2005) model is an inverted U-shaped 
relation between innovation and competition. The model is built on the assumption of a 
product market and fits manufacturing firms well. A number of empirical studies 
covering the manufacturing sector indicate that an inverse U-shaped relation between 
competition and R&D can be found. However, innovation includes strategies over a 
wide set of parameters such as technological choice of machinery and investments, 
education of the labor force, offshoring of R&D etc; hence, not only intramural R&D is 
affected by competition. In addition, innovation in the service sector is often linked to 
disembodied technological change and non-technological innovative processes such as 
organizational arrangements etc. Altogether, evidence points at R&D being less 
dominant as a major indicator of innovation for the service sector than for the 
manufacturing sector. Therefore, it is of particular interest to analyze how the inverse 
U-shaped relation stands up in an empirical test on the service sector.  
Our results point at an inverse U-shaped relation between competition and 
R&D in the service sector. However, some firms deviate from the general picture. The 
connection between R&D and competition is somewhat weaker in non-exporting firms. 
For those firms, we find no inverse U-shaped relation to competition. Hence, measures 
                                                           
16 For an introduction to the pay offs and motives for R&D, see e.g. Cohen and Levinthal (1989). 
 of competition signal that R&D in non-exporting service firms reacts different to 
competition than R&D in exporting firms.
17    
To broaden the picture of firms’ reaction patterns, we analyze alternative 
responses to competition from different types of innovative activities. More specifically, 
we separate innovative activities into expenditures on intramural R&D, expenditures on 
extramural R&D and expenditures on the acquisition of external knowledge (education, 
training etc.). We find evidence of an inverted U relation not only for intramural R&D 
but also for training and acquisition of external knowledge. For service-sector firms, 
technology is often more bounded to knowledge and soft technology than for 
manufacturing firms. Therefore, education and training might be especially important 
for service-sector firms. Thus, it is interesting to note that intramural R&D and 
education and training respond to competition in a similar manner. However, this 
pattern is not found for extramural R&D. As competition goes up, there is a tendency to 
reallocate from extramural to intramural R&D. This can be taken as an indication of 
either a home preference for local R&D or as an indication of Sweden being a relatively 
competitive country as a location for R&D. 
Finally, we analyze how the propensity to participate in strategic alliances is 
affected by competition. We find that small and large firms behave differently. There is 
a tendency for small firms to seek more strategic alliances as competition goes up, while 
we see the opposite for large firms. These contradicting observations may be explained 
by small firms’ limited capacity to host large innovation projects by themselves when – 
at the same time – increasing competition makes it crucial to be at the technological 
frontier. For large firms, on the other hand, which have a larger internal capacity to 
                                                           
17 The Boone PE-measure indicates that the more fierce competition non-exporters face, the more do they 
spend on R&D. 
 handle innovation projects, the pay off of an incremental edge to competitors increases 
as competition becomes more fierce (neck-to-neckness), giving an argument for not 
sharing new discoveries with competitors.  
At a general level, we note that the inverse U-shape found suggests that the risk 
of decreased R&D and innovation as a consequence of fighting low competition is 
probably limited. To be precise, in low competition markets, R&D activity most likely 
increases with competition while in markets where competition is already very fierce, a 
further increase in competition may reduce the incentives to innovate.   
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18 1. R&D: Total Research and Development expenditures  in 1990 constant prices. 
Source: Statistics Sweden/Research Statistics. 




























3. Export ratio:  Exportit/salesit. 
4. TFP: Total factor productivity (measured by means of Törnqvist index).  
Source: Statistics Sweden/Financial Statistics. 
5. Technology gap, maximum TFP for the ith firms in the mth industry.  









= − , where j = leading firm 
7. Size. Source: Statistics Sweden/Financial Statistics. 
8. Skillint: Share of employees with post secondary education. 
Source: Statistics Sweden/Regional Labor Statistics. 
9. Intramural R&D. Source: Statistics Sweden /CIS survey 2 through 5. 
10. Extramural R&D. Source: Statistics Sweden /CIS survey 2 through 5. 
                                                           
18 R&D is an activity which takes place on a systematic basis to increase the body of knowledge, 
including the knowledge of people, culture and society as well as the application of this knowledge to 
new areas and to develop or improve products, systems and methods (definition by Statistics of Sweden). 
 11. Expenditure on external knowledge/training. Source: Statistics Sweden /CIS survey 
2 through 6. 
12. Collaboration in innovative activities (yes/no) with a competitor. Source: Statistics 
Sweden /CIS survey 2 through 6. 
 
Table A1. Competition and R&D, Tobit estimation, Exporters and non-exporters 
Variable  1. No exp  
tot exp 
2. No exp / 
tot exp 
3. No exp / 
serv exp 







































2   0.0057 
(3.35) 
 -0.0006 





































































Period dum.      yes      yes      yes      yes 
Industry dum.      yes      yes      yes      yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.16 0.16 0.16  0.16 
Obs  24 212  23 929  24 263  23 980 
F-test no exp. 
(A) 0.179 0.003 0.000  0.000 
F-test exp. 
(B) 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. t-value within parenthesis (). 
(A) F-test competition variables, non-exporters. 
(B) F-test competition variables, exporters. 
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Period dum.      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes 
Industry dum.      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes      yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.05 0.03  0.02  0.02 0.02 
Obs  2 274  2 263  2 274  2 263  2 057  2 049 
F-test  < 50 
(A) 0.000  0.847 0.000  0.891  0.209 0.144 
F-test > 50 
(B) 0.010  0.316 0.093  0.946  0.493 0.028 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. t-value within parenthesis (). 
(A) F-test competition variables, 10-49 employees. 
(B)  (C)  F-test competition variables, 50+ employees. 
Expenditures in external knowledge excluding investments in machinery (embodied technical change), 
i.e., training and education are the main components.  
(B) As a robustness test, we re-estimated Col. 1 (with the most significant competition variables) by way 
of XTGLS − ignoring self censoring. The estimated coefficients for the Herfindahl index changed as 
follows; (-0.009 Æ-0.005; -1.5e-06Æ-8.9e-07; -0.007Æ-0.005; -9.1e-07Æ-7.8e-07). In addition, using 
XTGLS, the significance of coefficients increased to about -40 for the linear terms and approx. -13 for the 








 Table A3. Cols 1-2: Competition and the probability of strategic alliances with 
competitors. Cols 3-4: Share intramural/extramural R&D and competition. 
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(0.70)    
Period  dum.      yes      yes        yes      yes 
Industry dum.      yes      yes         yes      yes 
Pseudo R
2 0.10 0.10   0.002  0.006 
Obs  2 141  2 127   262  262 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. t-value within parenthesis (). 
(A) Model 1-4 analyze how competition affects the probability that a firm has tactic innovation related 
cooperation with one or more competitors.  
(B) Models 5-6 analyze how the share of intramural/extramural R&D is affected by competition-test 
competition variables. 
 
 Table A4. Descriptive statistics, firm averages, by industry, 1997-2005. 
     CIS survey data    Financial statistics, register data 
Ind.  
Code 














50 Retail  and  petrol  12189 163 n.a   109 0.38 1099 0.02 -3.78 305
51 Retail,  vehicles  146 109 87  112 3.89 2525 0.10 -4.86 733
52  Retail, personal articles  n.a n.a n.a  127 0.10 1080 0.02 -4.89 865
55 Hotel  n.a n.a n.a  105 0.04 1057 0.03 -4.51 543
60  On land transportation  33 30 13  104 0.10 1100 0.02 -3.45 389
61  Sea based transportation  32 39 13  176 0.02 1148 0.21 -1.90 710
62 Air  based  transportation  38 0 2  209 0.73 1218 0.11 -5.82 4890
63  Storage and reloading  284 62 102  143 0.36 1288 0.10 -3.67 1036
64  Post, TV and Radio  359 481 429  257 8.23 2886 0.05 -4.43 2  870
65 Capital  services  n.a n.a n.a  138 n.a n.a n.a n.a 5  733
66 Insurances  n.a n.a n.a  96 n.a n.a n.a n.a 7  688
Note: Observations in column 1-3 stem from CIS surveys. Figures in the right-hand panel stem from the Financial Statistics (FS) including all service firms with at 
least 50 employees. 
 
 Total factor productivity 
 
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) emphasized the importance of disaggregating the data 
on capital and labor. Gunnarsson and Mellander (1999) provide evidence on the 
importance of using disaggregated data when constructing a productivity measurement. 
We assume that the deflated sales value, Y, is produced using four factors of production; 
capital K, skilled labor S, unskilled labor U, and intermediate goods M. We assume a 
general production function  
) , , , ( it it it it it it M U S K F A Y =  
where Yit is a Hicks neutral efficiency parameter measuring total factor productivity. As 
a first step in constructing a total factor productivity index, a functional form must be 
chosen. The Cobb-Douglas production function assumes all inputs to be substitutes, 
whereas the Translog allows for complementarity between inputs. We use the Divisia 
Törnqvist index in order to calculate changes in the input mix (a non parametric 
approach).
19 This index corresponds to a Translog production function. We calculate 
TFP as the ratio of deflated sales value to an index of input volumes (a Törnqvist 
quantity index of inputs).  
) ,..., ( 1 nt t
t
t X X f
Y
TFP =  
or, put differently, 
t t t X Y TFP ln ln ln − =  
similarly, growth in TFP:  
. ln ln ln t t t X Y TFP Δ − Δ = Δ  
An important assumption in the calculations is that time is continuous. The majority 
of economic data is not continuous, however, and therefore a discrete approximation is 
often used, e.g. the Divisia index. Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) suggested a Törnqvist 
discrete-time approximation to the Divisia index. In the Törnqvist (1936) index, the 
weights used to aggregate the inputs are simply arithmetic averages of the 
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19 This index fulfills important properties such as invariance and independence; see e.g., Diewert (1976, 
1978). Regarding prices for capital, we compute rental prices according to Harper Berndt 
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where PK,t is the rental price for capital, Pi,t-1 is the appropriate investment price index, r 
is the nominal long-term interest rate and  K δ  is the average rate of depreciation. The 
yearly depreciation rates, retrieved by the Statistics Sweden "National Accounts", are 
18% for machinery and 3.18% for buildings. 
 
The Gelos and Isgut (2001) method for calculating capital stocks 
Gelos and Isgut (2001) suggest that the conventional PI method can be improved 
through the following two-step calculations: 
Step 1:     t t t t t S I BF K Max K − + − − = − ) , 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
1 1 δ
where K
1 is the net capital stock at time t calculated in step 1,  BFt-1 t  is the book value in  
t-1, I is gross investments and S capital disposal (calculated by comparing gross and net 
investments). The initial value on capital is based on the book value reported in the first 
year where the firm is observed in the dataset. The maximizing routine guarantees that 
we are left with the largest observed value, either the value calculated on the net capital 
stock in  t-1, i.e.,  K
1, or the observed book value in  t-1 , i.e., BFt-.  t
In step 2, we update the values on the capital stock to account for mergers or other 
factors such as when a firm’s accountant revaluates a building or machinery (in this 
case, gross investments are substituted by - I+S ). According to the Gelos and Isgut 
(2001) method, these updated values constitute the adjusted capital stocks. 










Step 2:    
Using this method means that we calculate a value on the capital stock for each year 
the firm is active in the database, except the last year. Thus, this version of the PI 
method allows us to adjust for specific events, such as mergers and revaluations of a 
firms capital. The method was originally used to adjust capital stocks where an initial 
book value may have been too low, i.e., under-estimated capital. Book values are 
actually not used in the PI method, but these can be informative as a quality control for 
the capital stock.  
 